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This paper provides the results of a phenomenological study of patients with schizophrenia
during their first psychiatric hospitalization. The study aims at clarify aspects related to the
diagnosis of schizophrenia and to reach a greater understanding of the illness, with a view to
contribute to prevention and psychotherapeutic intervention models. First, the paper offers
a description of the patients’ “disembodiment” manifested in acute phases of schizophre-
nia. Second, it presents a description of the subjective anomalies that may be considered as
disorders of “ipseity” or of pre-reflexive self-awareness.Third, the description is extended
to encompass secondary disturbances to processes of establishing consensual intersub-
jectivity that lead to difficulties in shared communication practices and a progressive
withdrawal from the intersubjective world.The conclusion states that a structural element,
a key part of the personal processes involved in schizophrenia, is the diminishment of
self-presence in experience, which manifests on both individual and social levels.
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INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, in the field of phenomenological psychopathology
disorders of the self have been stressed as the essential clinical char-
acteristics of schizophrenia. One hundred years ago, Jaspers was
already describing them among the dimensions of self-awareness
(1). Nevertheless, only in recent years has their importance been
widely recognized, probably due to the increasingly significant
focus on the early detection and prevention of psychosis (2).
Neither there has been any great interest in this field in explain-
ing nor understanding how disorders of the self are manifested
on the social level. Again, it is only recently that hallucinations
have begun to be considered as elements worthy of research in
phenomenological approaches to intersubjectivity (3, 4).
Within the framework of contemporary psychopathological
phenomenology, schizophrenia has been regarded as a paradig-
matic disturbance of embodiment and intersubjectivity (5–12). It
can be argued that its disorders are mainly manifested on two levels
(13): (1) a disorder of “ipseity” or of pre-reflexive self-awareness
that manifests as a diminishment of the first-person perspective
tacitly given in experience, and (2) a secondary disturbance in the
consensual processes of intersubjectivity, leading to difficulties in
shared communication practices and in finding a place for oneself
in the social world.
This paper provides the results of a phenomenological study
of patients with schizophrenia during their first psychiatric hos-
pitalization. First, it provides a description of patients’ “disem-
bodiment” manifested in acute phases of schizophrenia. Second,
it presents a description of the subjective anomalies most com-
monly experienced by these patients that may be considered as
disorders of “ipseity” or of pre-reflexive self-awareness. Third, the
description is extended to encompass secondary disturbances to
processes of establishing consensual intersubjectivity that lead to
difficulties in shared communication practices and a progressive
withdrawal from the intersubjective world.
The study aims at clarify aspects related to the diagnosis of
schizophrenia and to reach a greater understanding of the illness,
with a view to contribute to prevention and psychotherapeutic
intervention models. From this viewpoint, it seems appropriate
to use methods that attempt to characterize not only the patients’
symptomatic disturbances manifested in acute phases of schizo-
phrenia but also the anomalous self-experiences, which precede
the onset of positive symptoms, thus broadening the scope of
exploration to areas not taken into account in the criteriologi-
cal manuals of diagnostic systems diagnostic statistical manual
of mental disorders (DSM) and international classification of
diseases (ICD) (14).
The manuscript is focused on the description of the subjective
phenomena manifested among patients in different phases during
their first psychiatric hospitalization, taking illustrative examples
of three cases corresponding to a variety of schizophrenia sub-
types. Cases 1, 2, and 3, as they appear in the paper, correspond to




The study was developed within the qualitative paradigm, it being
an explorative–descriptive type of study. This type of studies pro-
ceeds with inductive logic: in other words, both hypotheses and
analysis categories are developed as the study progresses, and
emerge from the data itself [Danhke, 1989 quoted in Ref. (15)].
The so-called “critical case sampling” criteria was used, where
the interest in an in-depth approach to the phenomena means
working with few cases, with representativeness not being of key
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importance for these purposes. An in-depth approach allows to
access to the essential aspects of the personal experience, aim-
ing at a greater understanding of the phenomena under research
(16–18).
Data gathering were performed by means of semi-structured
interviews, which are characterized by the use of eminently “open”
research questions. Less structured methods allow for the emer-
gence of ideographic descriptions, personal beliefs, and meanings,
focusing on “how” the psychological processes occur (19).
The study proceeded with caution to avoid the bias commonly
seen as a threat to the validity of qualitative data (20–22) (see
Procedures and Analysis). All the interviews were recorded on
video and fully transcribed for subsequent analysis. Extracts of
the patients’ accounts were kept literally in quotes.
PARTICIPANTS
The broad study covered a total of 15 patients with schizophre-
nia during their first psychiatric hospitalization. All of them were
males, aged between 18 and 25. At the time of the interviews, the
patients were receiving the usual pharmacological treatment for
the diagnosis of schizophrenia.
Additional inclusion criteria were the following: (1) accessibil-
ity to the sample, (2) homogenous sample (23), and (3) earlier first
onset and higher risk of developing schizophrenia in men (24).
Illustrative examples are provided of three cases, which were
selected from the broader homogenous sample due to the vari-
ety of subtypes. Cases 1, 2, and 3, as they appear in the paper,
correspond to patients with diagnoses of disorganized-type,
paranoid-type, and catatonic-type schizophrenia, respectively.
INSTRUMENTS
In-depth interviews
In-depth interviews were used to gather qualitative data from the
first encounter with the patients. These interviews had open ques-
tions aimed at allowing for a natural manifestation of the patients’
accounts. For the first encounter, the recommendations on inter-
views for the phenomenological diagnosis of schizophrenia were
taken into account (25).
Examination of anomalous self-experience
The examination of anomalous self-experience [EASE; (26)] is a
semi-structured interview for the phenomenological examination
of disorders of the pre-reflexive self, postulated as early mark-
ers or basic phenotype of the schizophrenic spectrum (27). The
EASE explores a variety of anomalous self-experiences, which typ-
ically precede the onset of positive symptoms and which also often
underlie negative and disorganized symptoms (2).
Positive and negative syndrome scale
The positive and negative syndrome scale [PANSS; (28)] is a rating
scale used for measuring symptom severity of patients with schiz-
ophrenia. The name refers to the two types of symptoms: positive
symptoms, which refers to an excess or distortion of normal func-
tions (e.g., hallucinations and delusions), and negative symptoms,
which represents a diminution or loss of normal functions.
PROCEDURES AND ANALYSES
Five encounters with the patients were carried out. These encoun-
ters were coordinated throughout the three following phases.
Phase I
A first encounter to record the patients’ self-experiences mani-
fested in acute phases of schizophrenia was carried out 1–2 weeks
after hospitalization (30–45 min interview), following the confir-
mation of the diagnosis of schizophrenia in accordance with expert
judgment and the standard diagnostic criteria of DSM-IV-R (29)
and ICD-10 (30).
The patients’ accounts of the disturbances of self-experience
and body alienations manifested in the acute episodes were
summarized in corresponding descriptions containing the essen-
tial structure of the transcripts, which were obtained with the
“Descriptive Phenomenological Method in Psychology” (31), by
following five steps: (1) the researcher reads the entire transcript
in order to gain an overall sense, (2) the same transcript is then read
more slowly, and underlined every time a transition in meaning is
perceived, providing a series of units constituting meaning, (3) the
researcher then eliminates redundancies and clarifies the meaning
of the units, connecting them together to obtain a sense of the
whole, (4) the arising units are expressed essentially in the language
of the subject, revealing the essence of the situation for him, and
finally, (5) there is the summarizing and integrating of the achieved
understanding in a description with the essential structure of the
transcript.
Phase II
Two following encounters to carry out the “EASE” (26) took place
after 1 month of hospitalization (30–45 min per each interview),
when patients did not score with “positive” symptomatology on
the “PANSS” (28).
The EASE manual was translated into Spanish by experts in
phenomenological psychopathology, and advised by professional
translators. The Spanish version was evaluated by the research
team of lead author Parnas, who subsequently formally authorized
its publication (32).
The interviewer must pass an EASE Introductory Course,which
covers the following components: (1) a 1-day theoretical seminar,
(2) a number of supervised interviews, and (3) a provisional assess-
ment of reliability. This author attended the EASE Introductory
Course on September 12th to 14th, 2011, at the Mental Health
Center Hvidovre, Broendby, Denmark (see www.easenet.dk).
Phase III
Finally, two further encounters were held 1–2 months after hospi-
talization to perform the life story interviews (30–45 min per each
interview). Transcripts were analyzed by peer researchers, both
clinical psychologists with a specialty in psychotherapy. To avoid
bias, each researcher previously made a separate analysis and then
met for the co-analysis, ensuring with this procedure the validity
of the qualitative research.
Note. More broadly speaking, the study includes a section on the
patients’ life stories, which has been published in a complementary
paper focused on analyzing the interpersonal processes involved
in schizophrenia [see Ref. (33)]. Therefore, results of Phase III of
the broad research have not been included in this paper.
ETHICAL ISSUES
The broad research, covering 15 patients with schizophrenia
during their first psychiatric hospitalization, was regarded as
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entailing no physical, psychological, or social risks for the sub-
jects involved, based on the Declaration of Helsinki principles,
the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences
(CIOMS) 1992 International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical
Research Involving Human Subjects, and the 1996 International
Conference on Harmonization (ICH) Good Clinical Practice
guidelines, by the following Ethics Committees: (1) Research into
Human Beings Ethics Committee of the University of Chile’s
Medical Faculty, dated January 19, 2011. (2) Ethics Committee
Research of the Psychiatric Hospital, dated August 2, 2012. (3)
Ethics Committee Research of the North Metropolitan Health
Service (Santiago, Chile), dated August 16, 2012.
The Ethics Committees also approved the patients’ and their
tutors’ (legal representatives) consent documents. In this regard,
the following ethical aspects were taken into account: (1) consent
was informed and obtained from the patients’ tutors by the attend-
ing doctor at Phase I of the study, considering that as a patient
affected by an acute episode of schizophrenia, his competence or
capacity is diminished and he must be authorized to participate.
(2) Consent was obtained directly from the patients at Phase II
of the study. (3) Pseudonyms were employed to protect the iden-
tity of the patients and ensure confidentiality (internal codes were
used for each patient to replace their original names).
Note
Careful attention was paid in this paper to the protection of
the patients’ anonymity. Identifying information such as dates,
locations, and hospital numbers was avoided.
RESULTS
DISEMBODIMENT
Phenomenology has developed a distinction between lived body
(Leib) and physical body (Koerper), or body subject and body
object. The former is the body experienced “from within,” my
own immediate experience of my body tacitly given in the first-
person perspective. The latter is the body thematically investigated
“from without,” or from a third-person perspective, for example,
by natural sciences such as anatomy and physiology (12, 34).
The term “embodiment” does not refer to biological or phys-
ical aspects of the body, such as the organs or the functionality
of biological systems, but rather to a dimension that could be
described as existential or experience-based: the embodied subject
with regard to the intersubjective world.
In this regard, the embodiment-related dimension of mental
illnesses does not manifest itself as impairment at an organic or
biological level, but rather as a disturbance in the experience of
one’s own body.
The disturbance of embodiment characteristic of schizophre-
nia has been called “disembodiment” (9, 10, 12). This does not
literally imply a division, divorce, or separation between mind and
body, but rather a “subjective distancing.” The body loses its tacit
central role and does not serve as a medium of one’s involvement
in the world any more (13).
The body loses its familiarity, resulting in various forms of
body alienations. Single bodily sensations, movements, feelings,
perceptions, or thoughts no longer flow naturally as mediating
processes of embodiment but appear as obstacles to awareness
with object-like qualities (10).
In acute phases of schizophrenia, the mediacy of the body is
affected as a whole. And rather than being tacit and transparent,
the body takes on layers of opacity. The body loses its transparent
quality, its tacit experience-based function, turning into an object
of observation, of thinking, of concern, and thus ends up being
the “thematic” of an impediment or a problem.
Examples
Case 1. This first example is of a patient with disorganized-type
schizophrenia who, although he considers himself to be a“normal”
person, begins to recognize a “repetitive failure.” It is primar-
ily the mediating process of thinking that has become the main
impediment for the patient.
The trouble I was having was heart pain, together with
headaches, nothing more. I thought that it would be another
sort of hospitalisation [not psychiatric]. Now, I admit that my
experiences were strange: the voices I hear inside my head.
These voices are as if my own voice appeared inside my head
saying a lot of terrible things, really bad things, like ‘evilisa-
tions’ (patient’s neologism). Also, other things are repeated
in my head like an echo, for example, lately, ‘discharge me,
discharge me soon’. Most of the voices I hear repeat things I
don’t understand, I don’t know what they mean. Also, I get
the feeling that there is like a sound repeating itself in my
body, in my throat, going like m, m, m, m.
Patients with schizophrenia take an external position of self-
observation, becoming a mere spectator of themselves. This ten-
dency to take external or “disembodied” perspectives with regard
to oneself is what eventually leads patients to create pathologi-
cal attributions or explanations of their emotional processes or of
their own bodies (8).
Case 2. The following example illustrates the “pathological”
explanations configuring the delusion of a patient with paranoid-
type schizophrenia. The patient has not been able to find a con-
vincing explanation for the fear he feels, which has become his
major impediment. Instead of attributing the fear to his existen-
tial processes or biographical circumstances, the patient assumes
an external explanation: the biblical time of the “Tribulation.”
I wanted to find a way to overcome the fear, but now I don’t
know what to think any more, what is causing this fear. I think
I could be delivered over to the Tribulation –the Tribulation
is a biblical time of pain, that I could be delivered over to
pain. I’d like to find an answer in the Bible, what I’ve got to
do, how to live and how to face up to the fear, and what’s
going to happen. However, what I’ve read in the Bible hasn’t
been enough: it doesn’t show me way, the exact way I should
take for the situation I think that I am experiencing. I wish
that the Bible could tell me what you do in the Tribulation,
if I was in that time, that it told me in light of this fear to do
this or that, to face up to it, don’t be afraid, I’ll be with you.
In acute phases of schizophrenia, patients’accounts concentrate on
(or are limited to) their anomalous self-experiences or body alien-
ations. In other words, patients’accounts lie outside the time-space
dimension of the social context and exclude the personal history.
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Body alienation appears to be the way in which the desubjectivised
accounts find concrete form (or are materialised).
Case 3. This example is of a patient with catatonic-type schiz-
ophrenia. The body alienations are explained as “demonic pos-
sessions,” which seems to increase the patient’s pathological
condition.
Well, what happens is that I had strange things, possessions.
I got like cramps back in my head, my body began to cramp
up, and I began to shout, to cry and to scream like a devil. I
feel that someone is possessing my body. I thought it could
be a satanic influence. I don’t know: I did a bit of research
and the spirit gets in when someone is too depressed, when
you’re depressed is when the spirits get in. That makes me
scared. It’s something that’s out there, something imminent,
then it becomes pressing for me, when it begins to talk for
me. I even hear a buzzing on my left side, inside my head.
For instance, the pervasive fear experienced by paranoid patients
becomes the predominant external threat that acquires the char-
acteristics of a delusion. These patients have a constant fear of
being harmed or killed by others: somehow, it is the world and
“the others” that have become unreliable or threatening, as shown
in the following example.
Case 2
About three months ago I began to feel persecuted, perse-
cuted by people. My house was the only place I felt safe, but
for a few weeks now I have even begun to feel unsafe at home.
The idea that they can hurt me comes from the fear I feel
and I think that the worst thing would be for them to kill
me somehow, like stabbing me, for example. Anything can
happen these days.
Something curious about psychotic states is that not only do
patients see the world through the framework of their delusions
but also that this view is irrefutable to them. This implies a diffi-
culty to enter into an open interaction that takes into account the
viewpoint of the other person. In a way, the patient stands out-
side of the intersubjective dialectic provided by the second-person
perspective (35), like in the next example.
Case 2
I found it suspicious that my workmates didn’t want to have
their tea where I had mine, so I thought they had put some-
thing in it, some spit maybe, or that they had poured some
vinegar in it. I saw a teapot and a thermos, and if I took it out
of the thermos, they took it out of the pot, and that seemed
odd to me so I threw away the tea. They didn’t like me, I
thought, because of the way I am, not very friendly or ‘chatty’.
I asked my workmates if they had put anything in my tea and
they said no, nothing, but I didn’t believe them. The matter
of food is a difficult one for me.
Besides, in the psychotic state, it could metaphorically be said
that there is “no-border” between one’s self and others, as
would normally be the case. There is a loss of the ability to
distinguish between self-created meanings and those created by
others, and to realize, as we normally do, that inanimate objects
cannot actually create meanings or messages (e.g., self-referential
messages patients discern from what they have heard on the radio,
watched on television, or read in the newspapers). It could also be
noted that there is a pervasive and unnoticed “self-referentiality”
in experience in this state.
IPSEITY
Current psychopathological phenomenology has gained ground,
emphasizing that the roots of mental illness are to be found in
the patient’s pre-reflexive or pre-thematic experience (36). From
this viewpoint, it is argued that schizophrenia involves a particular
disturbance of basic self-awareness, more specifically a disorder of
“ipseity,” normally occurring tacitly or pre-reflexively.
Ipseity (ipse is Latin for self or itself) refers to the fundamental
configuration of self-awareness, corresponding to the first-person
perspective tacitly given in experience (2, 37, 38). This perspective
is oriented intentionally “from within” toward the world, and pre-
supposes an immediate sense of “mineness” of the experience, as
“being mine” or as “my own doing,” i.e., a quality of “personally
belonging” or of “personalization” (1). The diminishment of this
perspective mode of self-experience would lead to characteristic
anomalies or basic disorders of the schizophrenic spectrum.
From the phenomenological examination of patients’ experi-
ences (26, 32), disorders of ipseity are predominantly manifested in
the domain of “cognition and stream of consciousness.” They are
also frequently manifested in the domain of “bodily experiences,”
like the sensation and/or perception of a “morphological change”
of the body, as well as “mirror-related phenomena” (repeatedly
looking at oneself in the mirror). Stereotypical conduct or motor
interference, resulting from patients’ losing control of their own
experience, is also manifested.
Within the domain of “cognition and stream of consciousness,”
patients refer to “thought interference,” i.e., they refer to having
experienced thoughts or imaginations that appear automatically,
interrupting the main line of thought or interfering with it. Some-
times they intensify, ending up as “thought pressure”: a sense of
many thoughts, lacking coherence with one another, appear in
quick sequences without the patient being able to control them.
Similarly, in some cases, patients have the feeling that their own
thoughts are automatically (involuntarily) repeated or being in
some way duplicated.
Thoughts are often experienced in a spatially localized way, and
also with acoustic/auditory qualities. Frequently, there is a tran-
sition from experiencing thoughts on a quasi-perceptual level to
external auditory hallucinations. In the beginning, patients hear
their own thoughts not with their ears, but as their own voices
inside their heads. With the diminishment of the sense of “mine-
ness,” thoughts lose their familiarity, and patients now start to
hear other voices inside their head (which no longer appear to
them to be their thoughts). The voices are anonymous (imper-
sonal): patients do not identify them with anyone in particular,
and only fleetingly do they realize that these voices could be their
own thoughts.
In full-blown psychosis, the experience is externalized, and the
voices are heard as coming from the outside, thus acquiring the
characteristics of a hallucination. The patient regards as an external
reality something that is, in fact, part of his own fragmented
Frontiers in Psychiatry | Affective Disorders and Psychosomatic Research February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 9 | 4
Irarrázaval The lived body in schizophrenia
experience. It could be said that, in the psychotic state, subjective
experience is lived as “not as one’s own” and acquires an “inverted
intentionality” (9, 39) as is the case of the next example.
Case 1
Sometimes I repeat my thoughts as if I were reading them,
and I also hear voices on the radio, as if they were saying
what I’m thinking: these are voices of unknown people who
seem to be talking to me, but I don’t not know how or why
they do so. Additionally, it sometimes seems to me that some
television personalities repeatedly say things to me, all sorts
of things, thousands of stupid things that I don’t understand,
and nor do I understand why they’re doing this. Moreover,
I heard a young man repeating all the things, I heard them
everywhere, in the atmosphere, even with my mouth closed
things were repeated any way.
Up to this point, the transition has moved from disorders of
ipseity to disorders of “agency,” leading to an externalization of
self-experience and loss of demarcation between the self and
the environment (40). In this way, the subject gradually loses
his self-presence in the experience. This transition occurs from
momentary experiences of disembodiment to the more severe
“depersonalization” (or desubjectivisation) manifested in the psy-
chotic state. Here, the term “depersonalization” refers to severe
self-disorders, i.e., thoughts, actions, or feelings occurring “with
the awareness of their not being mine, of being alien, automatic,
independent, arriving from elsewhere” [Ref. (1), p. 121].
INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Patients with schizophrenia display difficulties in naturally and
spontaneously immersing themselves in everyday life, and find it
particularly hard to grasp the “common sense” of situations (41–
43). Generally, patients do not feel that they are fully participating
or completely present in the world.
Misunderstandings and confusions about meanings are fre-
quent in patients’ interactions with others. Synchronicity in social
interaction seems interrupted mainly due to mismatches regard-
ing “meaning coordination” processes (44) and difficulties in
incorporating the perspective of others, as shown in the example
below.
Case 2
It could be, like, someone says a word and, like, it appears bad
to the other person: that’s what happens to me – words can
have a double meaning. Just a while ago I spoke to someone
and a slightly odd word came out. Like, he asked me why I
didn’t have breakfast, and I told him it was because it was a bit
of a pain. Then I thought that the person might be thinking
that I was saying that he was a pain. I worry that the other
person may take it the wrong way, because I don’t want to be
a bother.
To a greater or lesser extent, patients display difficulties in making
themselves understood or in explaining to others the experiences
affecting them. In extreme cases, those patients that are especially
self-absorbed or disconnected from the outside world (such as
patients with catatonic-type schizophrenia) have great difficulties
in articulating and expressing their experience, which remains to
a large degree ineffable. This group of patients displays marked
symptoms of affective flattening and autism.
Worth noting are the contradictory qualities of affection
that are manifested among patients. Patients with schizophrenia
are heterogeneous with regard to experience and expression of
affection. Affective flattening appears less characteristic among
paranoid patients.
In general, patients appear concerned with and anxious to
understand what is happening to them, to recover and to quickly be
discharged from their hospitalization. The majority refer to having
anxiety crises, suicidal ideations, and suicide attempts. Neverthe-
less, the latter do not arise from a typically depressed state of mind,
but rather from the desperation caused by patients’ experiences of
self-alienation.
In the two examples below, patients regard their anomalies of
self-experience and body alienations as an impediment or obstacle
to live a normal life. Disorders of the self extend to include inter-
subjectivity, leading to a radical withdrawal from the social world,
and to the extreme of contemplating suicide to put an end to their
alienation.
Case 1
There are times when thousands of things are repeated,
almost everything is repeated in my head, and then others
when they disappear and things are normal, but then they
come back again. Sometimes I couldn’t go out on the street,
I had to stay in bed, just sleeping to get away from these
thoughts. This has made it difficult for me to continue with
my studies and concentrate. The situation is annoying and
bad for me because I can’t live a normal life. It’s unbearable
for me sometimes, and makes me think of killing myself, of
hanging myself.
Case 3
I feel mental pressures, and it’s like they squeeze my brain,
my entire brain. My thoughts are jumbled up, they’re a mess
of ideas and thoughts. Reality gets distorted for me, too, I see
it in a different way, like it was dream. This makes daily life
difficult for me, living like this, living like this every day. I
find it hard to relate to other people: in fact, I’ve really dis-
tanced myself from my friends. Because of my mental state,
I don’t want to do anything: this bothers me, and makes me
desperate, deep down. I am worried about my mental health
state, not feeling normal. I’ve tried to kill my self several
times. Before they brought me here I was going to jump off




A structural element, a key part of the personal processes involved
in schizophrenia, is the diminishment of self-presence in experi-
ence. The subject gradually loses his self-presence in experience,
which manifests not only on the individual level but also on the
intersubjective level, leading to an early withdrawal from the social
world.
On the individual level, the diminishment of self-presence
in experience is a key element in the transition from basic
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self-disorders to full-blown psychosis. This transition occurs from
momentary experiences of disembodiment to the more severe
“depersonalization”(or desubjectivisation) manifested in the acute
episode.
In early or prodromal phases,before“positive”symptoms occur,
basic self-disorders are predominantly manifested in the domain
of “cognition and stream of consciousness,” including “thought
interference,” “thought pressure” and the feeling that thoughts
are automatically being “repeated” or duplicated. Thoughts are
often experienced in a spatially and localized way, and also with
acoustic/auditory qualities.
Basic self-disorders are also frequently manifested in the
domain of “bodily experiences,” like the sensation and/or per-
ception of a “morphological change” of the body, as well as
“mirror-related phenomena” (repeatedly looking at oneself in the
mirror). Stereotypical conduct or motor interference, resulting
from patients’ losing control of their own experience, is also
manifested.
On the intersubjective level, major disturbances in the processes
of synchronization with others are manifested. Patients do not feel
at all participating or entirely present in the world. They show diffi-
culties in dealing with consensual principles of understandability
(common sense) and in incorporating the perspective of others
(second-person perspective), which would appear to be impor-
tant variables to consider in the symptomatological description of
the schizophrenic spectrum disorders.
Patients with schizophrenia are heterogeneous with regard to
experience and expression of affection. Affective flattening appears
less characteristic among paranoid patients.
CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS
It is important to highlight the fact that hospitalization provides
the first setting for the patients becoming conscious of their ill-
ness. This is the time when the illness is manifested, stemming
from an initial psychotic break. This moment, which is critical in
the prognosis, is the turning point, since, once discharged, patients
return to the “non-place” that they occupied prior to hospitaliza-
tion and, in a best-case scenario, they will occupy the place of the
“sick person,” of the “schizophrenic.”
Medical-psychiatric intervention, which is the predominant
form of intervention in the acute phase of schizophrenia, is mainly
oriented toward reducing “positive” symptomatology. Neverthe-
less, looked at from a broader perspective, the symptomatological
aspect of the acute phase is merely a sign or a signal of the serious-
ness of the overall situation affecting the patient. Thus, it can be
seen that there is a need for diagnosis to involve more aspects of
the patient’s life, in addition to those symptomatic aspects treated
during hospitalization. This latter aim will require the effort of an
ongoing interdisciplinary intervention.
Descriptions of disorders of the self would appear helpful
in achieving a better understanding of the emergence of acute
episodes of schizophrenia, by following the transition from basic
disorders of ipseity to full-blown psychotic symptoms manifested
in the patients’ experiences of “disembodiment.” Additionally, it
would be also helpful to take into account the interpersonal sce-
nario in which the psychotic episode emerges. This is, to contextu-
alize the symptoms embedding them in the patients’ lives. What is
more, to ensure a comprehensive understanding the configuration
of schizophrenia, it would be necessary to examine disorders of the
self in the light of patients’ life stories [see Ref. (33)].
Actually, in many cases, it is difficult to confirm a diagnosis of
schizophrenia until well into hospitalization, or even until the ill-
ness is advanced. So, by broadening the scope of exploration of the
patient’s experience to areas not taken into account in the DSM
and ICD classifications, new descriptive elements are contributed
that could potentially provide clarification for diagnosis.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Diagnostic statistical manual of mental disorders and ICD diag-
nostic classifications require review in light of approaches aiming
for a greater understanding of the personal processes involved
in schizophrenia (from the patients’ viewpoint) and that make
it possible to explain aspects that remain unclear with regard
to the trustworthiness of the diagnosis. These manuals spring
from explanatory systems based on diagnostic categories accord-
ing to a description of the apparent symptomatology, in which the
assessment of subjective experience is basically excluded. How-
ever, patients’ accounts of their own anomalous experiences seem
essential for diagnostic accuracy and therapeutic purposes (14).
Diagnosis, in the terms currently proposed, consists in a com-
prehensive approach to the overall functioning, both mental and
bodily, of the person seeking help, encompassing not only sympto-
matic aspects but also his or her healthy potential, in addition to the
life context. In this way, it seems appropriate to develop methods
that attempt at developing a “person-centered” approach to diag-
nosis by employing a more comprehensive and holistic assessment
of the patients’ condition (45).
Simply put, the subject of the study must be the person as a
whole. This implies not only an in-depth review of the method-
ologies underlying traditional “objectivizing” diagnostic concep-
tualizations of mental illnesses but also a need to develop method-
ologies for the holistic study of patients, without losing sight of
their corporality, complexity, and uniqueness (46).
From this viewpoint, the use qualitative methodologies for the
study of schizophrenia and psychosis seem highly appropriate.
These are just the clinical pictures that have not been sufficiently
tackled from non-objectivizing approaches, and there is thus a sig-
nificant lack of understanding of these phenomena beyond their
apparent symptomatology.
Schizophrenia has been a central topic of research in phe-
nomenological psychiatry, which aims at detailed descriptions of
psychopathological experiences, and is committed to the in-depth
analysis of symptomatic aspects. In consequence, phenomeno-
logical psychopathology research should also be able to illumi-
nate key elements to incorporate in specific psychotherapeutic
interventions for persons with schizophrenia.
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